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Abstract:	Opium	poppy	cultivation	 in	Thailand	 fell	 from	12,112	hectares	 in	1961	 to	281	ha	 in	2015.	One	
outlier	exists:	Chiang	Mai	province’s	remote	southwestern	district,	Omkoi.	90%	of	the	district	is	a	national	
forest	reserve	where	human	habitation	is	illegal.	However,	an	ethnic	Karen	population	has	lived	there	since	
long	before	the	law	that	outlawed	them	was	created,	unconnected	to	the	state	by	road,	with	limited	or	no	
access	 to	 health,	 education	 and	 other	 services:	 they	 cultivate	 the	 majority	 of	 Thailand’s	 known	 opium	
poppy,	because	 they	have	 little	other	choice.	They	 increasingly	 rely	on	cash-based	markets,	 their	 lack	of	
citizenship	precludes	 them	 from	 land	 tenure	which	might	 incentivize	 them	 to	 grow	alternate	 crops,	 and	
their	 statelessness	 precludes	 them	 from	 services	 and	 protections.	 Nor	 is	 the	 Thai	 state	 the	 singular	
Leviathan	 that	 states	are	often	assumed	 to	be;	 it	 is	 a	 collection	of	networks	with	divergent	 interests,	of	
whom	one	of	the	most	powerful,	the	Royal	Forestry	Department,	has	purposely	made	Omkoi’s	population	
illegible	 to	 the	 state,	 and	has	 consistently	 blocked	 the	 attempts	 of	 other	 state	 actors	 to	 complexify	 this	
state	 space	 beyond	 the	 simplicity	 of	 its	 forest.	 These	 factors	 make	 short-term,	 high-yield,	 high	 value,	
imperishable	opium	the	most	 logical	economic	choice	for	poor	Karen	farmers	residing	 in	this	“non-state”	
space.	
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1.	Introduction	
Thailand’s	opium	poppy	cultivation	fell	from	12,112	hectares	(ha)	in	1961	to	281	ha	in	2015.	
By	most	standards	of	measurement,	the	country’s	“war”	on	drug	production	succeeded,	especially	
in	comparison	to	other	drug-producing	countries	such	as	Afghanistan,	Myanmar2,	Laos,	Colombia,	
Peru,	 Bolivia	 and	 Mexico.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime	 (UNODC)	 declared	
Thailand	“opium	free”	a	decade	ago,	and	has	not	included	Thailand	in	its	World	Drugs	Report	since	
2008.	 Thailand	 is	 also	 widely	 heralded	 as	 a	 successful	 example	 of	 “alternative	 development”	
programming,	which	seeks	to	replace	illicit	crops	with	licit	ones,	and	which	is	conducted	in	tandem	
with	 coercive	 policies	 to	 eliminate	 the	 opium	 economy,	 comprised	 of	 poppy	 cultivation,	
refinement	into	opium,	conversion	to	heroin,	and	export.	 	
One	 outlier	 exists:	 Chiang	Mai	 province’s	 remote	 southwestern	 district,	 Omkoi,	 where	 the	
majority	of	known	opium	cultivation	 in	Thailand	occurs.	90%	of	Omkoi	 is	 classified	as	a	national	
forest	C-Zone	reserve	area:	people	are	prohibited	from	inhabiting,	cultivating	or	otherwise	utilizing	
it.	But	a	large	ethnic	Karen	population	of	swidden	cultivators	has	lived	there	since	long	before	the	
law	that	outlawed	them	was	created.	They	reside	in	areas	unconnected	to	the	state	by	road,	with																																																									
1	 This	article	is	the	second	of	a	two-part	series	for	Forestry	and	Society;	the	first,	“People,	Land	and	Poppy:	
the	Political	Ecology	of	Opium	and	the	Historical	Impact	of	Alternative	Development	in	Northwest	Thailand”,	
was	published	in	Forest	and	Society	1/1,	April	2017.	
2	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 continuity	 this	 article	 uses	 the	 country	 names	 Thailand	 and	 Myanmar	 throughout,	
including	 in	 pre-1939	 Instances	when	 Thailand’s	 official	 name	was	 Siam,	 and	 in	 pre-1989	 instances	when	
Myanmar’s	official	name	was	Burma.	
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limited	 or	 no	 access	 to	 schools,	 health	 centers,	 and	 other	 services:	 select	 among	 them	 are	 the	
grassroots	 cultivators	 of	 Omkoi’s	 opium	 supply,	 sold	 onward	 to	 opaque	 networks	 the	 state	 is	
struggling	to	identify.	While	most	Karen	no	longer	engage	in	cultivation	or	consumption—indeed,	
most	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 Thai	 state	 as	 well	 as	 Thai	 culture—in	 remoter	 parts	 of	
Omkoi,	 Karen	 cultivation	 rates	 are	 the	 highest	 in	 Thailand.	 Thai	 and	 US	 drug	 control	 efforts	
historically	overlooked	this	district,	and	possibly	others	hosting	drug	production	not	yet	identified	
by	the	state,	because	 it	did	not	host	an	 interrelated	communist	 insurgency,	nor	were	cultivation	
rates	as	high	as	other	areas	of	NW	Thailand.	 	
Opium’s	profit	hardly	accrues	to	the	farmer.	Those	in	Omkoi	who	grow	opium	do	so	because	
they	 have	 little	 other	 choice.	 The	 encroachment	 of	 “development”	 upon	 Omkoi’s	 Karen	 has	
already	occurred	 through	 their	 growing	 reliance	on	 lowland	markets	where	 currency	 is	 the	only	
form	of	exchange,	and	opium	is	the	highest-value	cash	crop	around.	A	lack	of	citizenship	precludes	
much	of	the	rural	population	from	land	tenure	which	might	incentivize	the	growing	of	estate	crops	
with	a	lower	rate	of	return	and	a	longer	cultivation	period.	Their	statelessness	also	precludes	them	
from	services,	credit	and	other	protections.	Even	if	they	had	citizenship,	their	presence	in	a	C-Zone	
reserve	area	still	renders	them	“illegal”.	And	if	these	issues	are	all	overcome,	a	stark	truth	remains:	
there	is	no	alternative	crop	that	can	equal	the	price	a	farmer	earns	from	opium.	Previous	programs	
did	not	succeed	because	of	agriculture,	but	because	of	the	increased	presence	of	the	state.	
Nor,	in	the	case	of	Omkoi’s	Karen,	is	the	state	the	Leviathan	it	is	assumed	to	be;	it	is	a	set	of	
agencies	 and	 networks	 of	 divergent	 and	 contradictory	 interests,	 and	 this	 hobbles	 the	 state’s	
alternate	development	approach.	Omkoi’s	complexity	has	been	simplified	by	state	actors	around	
environmental	 concerns,	 but	 the	 attempts	 of	 other	 state	 actors	 to	 make	 Omkoi’s	 inhabitants	
legible	 leads	 to	 contradictions.	 For	 example,	 forestry	 officials	 refuse	 to	 allow	 the	 General	
Administration	 Department	 (GAD)	 to	 gazette	 settlements	 and	 provide	 services,	 and	 state	
extension	 agents	 cannot	 provide	 substitute	 crops	 which	 require	 land	 clearance	 or	 supporting	
infrastructure;	 in	 a	 reversal	 of	 “classic”	 statebuilding	 practice	 as	 described	 by	 Anderson	 (2006),	
Scott	 (1998),	 Tilly	 (1985,	 1990)	 and	 others,	 this	 government	 department	 purposely	 makes	 a	
population	 illegible.	 These	 factors	 serve	 to	 make	 short-term,	 high-yield,	 high	 value,	 easily	
transportable	and	 imperishable	opium	the	most	 logical	 choice	 for	poor	 farmers,	especially	given	
the	lack	of	law	enforcement	presence.	 	
That	 presence,	 however,	 is	 growing,	 most	 palpably	 in	 eradication	 and	 law	 enforcement.	
Omkoi	 has	 already	 been	 bureaucratically	 constructed—the	 state	 certainly	 doesn’t	 see	 it	 as	
stateless—but	the	complex	realities	on	the	ground	do	not	match	the	deliberately	simplified	prisms	
through	which	Omkoi	 is	 viewed.	The	district	hosts	 the	historical	extension	of	 lowland	Padi	 state	
power	 into	an	ungoverned,	untallied,	ephemeral	highland	 (Scott	2009)—one	of	 the	 last	areas	 in	
Thailand	to	undergo	this	process.	As	the	government	destroys	opium	poppy	but	does	not	replace	
it	with	alternates,	the	potential	for	future	unrest	cannot	be	discounted.	However,	a	middle	ground	
between	the	state’s	contradictory	positions	can	be	discerned.	
This	analysis	seeks	to	discover	how	the	state	can	reduce	opium	cultivation	and	preserve	the	
watershed	 whilst	 legitimating	 both	 Omkoi’s	 people	 and	 the	 Thai	 state,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 recent	
historical	circumstances	in	which	Omkoi	was	“forgotten”	by	the	state	in	the	first	place.	It	is	based	
on	 field	 research	 and	 interviews	 with	 Thai	 government	 officials,	 Karen	 leaders,	 security	 actors,	
academics,	 civil	 society	 representatives,	 local	 businesspersons,	 ex-cultivators,	 and	 recovering	
opium	addicts	 in	Omkoi,	Chiang	Mai,	and	other	areas,	from	December	2015	to	June	2017.	These	
findings	emerged	from	an	earlier	project	at	 the	National	University	of	Singapore’s	Lee	Kuan	Yew	
School	 of	 Public	 Policy,	 in	 collaboration	 with	 Chiang	 Mai	 University	 and	 the	 Government	 of	
Thailand’s	Office	of	the	Narcotics	Control	Board.	
2.	Contemporary	Opium	Poppy	Cultivation	in	Northwest	Thailand	
Omkoi	lies	170	kilometers	(a	four	hour	drive)	from	Chiang	Mai	town,	in	the	far	southwest	of	
the	province	near	the	Myanmar	border,	which	is	as	porous	as	it	is	under-patrolled3.	Of	the	281	Ha																																																									
3	 While	select	interviewees	state	that	the	border	is	well-patrolled,	the	majority	of	them	state	otherwise.	
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of	 opium	 poppy	 uncovered	 by	 Thai	 authorities	 in	 2015,	 142	 Ha	 occurred	 there.	 This	 was	 a	
significant	decline	from	the	246.37	Ha	identified	in	the	previous	year;	in	2016,	however,	The	Thai	
Office	 of	 the	 Narcotics	 Control	 Board	 (ONCB)’s	 surveillance	 revealed	 the	 highest	 cultivation	
identified	since	2009.	The	price	of	a	Joi	(1.6	Kilos)	of	opium	in	Omkoi	fluctuates	between	120,000	
and	170,000	Baht	 (US$3,650	–	US$5,170);	despite	government	assertions	 that	Omkoi’s	opium	 is	
only	 for	 internal	 markets,	 these	 fluctuations	 causally	 match	 international	 demand	 fluctuations.	
Opium	usage	 in	Omkoi	 is	 also	prevalent.	 The	Chiang	Mai	University	Medical	 Faculty’s	 substance	
abuse	research	center	estimates	that	Omkoi	hosts	5,000	addicts,	but	their	estimate	is	based	on	an	
arbitrarily	 assigned	 average	 of	 5-10	 addicts	 per	 village.	 No	 one	 knows	 the	 level	 of	 addiction	 in	
Omkoi,	 although	 anecdotally	 it	 is	 high.	 Omkoi’s	 six	 sub-districts	 contain	 roughly	 100	 villages,	
although	no	agreed-upon	figure	exists:	many	of	the	“villages”	are	only	a	set	of	homes	populated	by	
a	single	extended	family.	Omkoi’s	population	is	estimated	at	55,000;	each	government	agency	has	
a	different	population	figure4.	Most	of	Omkoi	is	inaccessible	during	the	rainy	season;	beyond	select	
main	 roads,	 the	 district	 lacks	 schools,	 medical	 facilities,	 roads	 and	 electrification,	 due	 to	 its	
national	 forest	 status	 (see	 below).	 Beyond	 the	 sub-district	 capitals,	 the	 area	 lacks	 government	
presence,	 and	 according	 to	 government	 interviewees,	 Omkoi	 serves	 as	 a	 place	 of	 exile	 for	
incompetent	civil	servants	who	are	often	absent	from	their	duty	stations5.	The	lack	of	educational	
opportunities	 in	Omkoi	over	generations	 results	 in	a	waiver	of	 the	civil	 servant	prerequisite	of	a	
secondary	school	diploma;	in	Omkoi,	civil	servants	only	need	to	speak	Thai.	
Approximately	 80%	 of	 Omkoi	 residents	 are	 non-Thai	 hill	 tribes	 that	 still	 practice	
swiddening—mostly	 highland	 Karen	 with	 family	 links	 to	 Myanmar.	 Anecdotally,	 most	 of	 the	
indigenous	population	living	in	the	remotest	areas	of	Omkoi	lack	Thai	citizenship	(UNESCO,	2010);	
the	 further	 one	 travels	 from	 a	 road	 in	 the	 district,	 the	 less	 Thai	 citizens	 one	 encounters,	 even	
though	nearly	all	Omkoi’s	Karen	have	lived	in	Thailand	for	generations.	
2.1.	The	Karen	in	Southeast	Asia	
Contemporary	issues	of	cultivation	in	Omkoi	involve	Karen	in	particular.	In	1983	Peter	Hinton	
wrote	 "Why	 the	 Karen	 do	 not	Grow	Opium:	 Competition	 and	 Contradiction	 in	 the	Highlands	 of	
North	Thailand",	and	this	assertion	continues	to	be	made.	But	 interviews	with	ONCB,	academics,	
and	Karen	informants	indicates	that	in	particular	areas	of	the	highlands,	they	do	grow	opium,	and	
they	did	 in	1983.	 In	Chiang	Mai’s	Nong	Tao,	a	village	 in	the	Mae	Wang	River	basin,	 for	example,	
Karen	began	 growing	opium	a	 century	 before,	 after	 it	was	 introduced	by	Hmong	migrants	 from	
China6	 who	planted	poppy	on	hillsides	cleared	of	teak.	In	Omkoi	Karen	have	been	growing	opium	
for	at	least	50	years.	
Southeast	 Asia’s	 Karen	 predominantly	 reside	 in	 Myanmar;	 roughly	 half	 a	 million	 live	 in	
Thailand	 (Delang,	 2003),	 although	 Karen	 interviewees	 state	 a	 population	 of	 close	 to	 1	 million.	
Thailand’s	Karen	are	generally	concentrated	along	the	Western	border	with	Myanmar,	from	Mae	
Hong	 Son	 to	 Ratchaburi	 and	 Petchaburi.	 Chiang	 Mai	 Province	 contains	 one-third	 of	 Thailand’s	
Karen.	 Sgaw	 are	 the	 largest	 Karen	 language	 sub-group,	 followed	 by	 Pwo	 (alt:	 Po).	 Two	 much	
smaller	 groups	exist:	Dtawng	Soo/	Pa’o	 and	Kaya/	Baway.	 Karen	historically	 reside	 at	 elevations	
ranging	from	600	to	1,000	meters7,	 in	small	villages	often	comprised	of	extended	family	units	of	
between	 10	 and	 200	 households.	 These	 village	 units	 were	 historically	 ephemeral,	 with	 villages	
subdividing	 constantly;	 entire	 villages	 would	 move	 as	 fields	 are	 planted,	 harvested	 for	 a	 few	
seasons,	and	then	left	fallow.	The	latter	half	of	the	20th	century	has	seen	ever-larger	numbers	of	
Thailand’s	Karen	move	from	the	hills	to	valleys	and	cities,	especially	youth.	 																																																									
4	 Interview,	CMU	Professors/	ONCB,	Chiang	Mai,	December	2015.	
5	 Interviews,	ONCB,	Chiang	Mai,	December	2015.	
6	 Interview,	Karen	leader	Phaw	Luang	Jorni	Odochao,	June	23,	2016.	
7	 In	 Myanmar,	 lowland	 Karen	 populations	 are	 found	 in	 delta	 areas	 that	 were	 once	 malarial	 forests	 and	
swamps	prior	to	the	British	relocation	of	the	capital	from	Mandalay	to	Yangon.	Delta	Karen	allied	with	the	
British	and	against	the	Bamar	who	were	their	oppressors;	against	the	historical	norm,	they	did	not	flee,	and	
Karen	communities	remain	in	the	Ayeyarwady,	although	many	no	longer	speak	Karen.	
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The	Karen	 identity	appears	 to	 signify	 the	external	peoples	and	modes	of	 governance	which	
Karen	wish	to	distinguish	themselves	from,	rather	than	what	Karen	are	in	the	absence	of	the	other.	
The	identity	was	promoted	in	early	20th	century	Myanmar	by	British	officials,	 in	order	to	simplify	
their	census	(Cheesman,	2002),	and	by	missionaries	who	midwifed	Karen	nationalism.	Cheesman,	
Scott,	 and	 other	 scholars	 note	 that	 the	 Karen,	 when	 viewed	 as	 a	 whole,	 share	 no	 common	
language,	 culture,	 history,	 or	 religious	 belief:	 their	 languages	 are	 not	mutually	 intelligible.	 Their	
religions	 include	 Buddhism,	 Catholicism,	 and	 various	 Protestant	 sects;	 some	 are	 purely	 animist,	
while	 elements	 of	 animism	are	 also	 found	 in	 Karen	 practices	 of	 other	 religions.	 The	 delineation	
between	Karen	sub-groups	is	unclear,	as	is	their	delineation	from	other	non-Karen	groups	such	as	
Kachin	and	Shan.	Although	all	 identities,	 including	Han	and	Thai,	are	constructed,	 the	Karen	and	
numerous	other	highland	 tribes	are	stark	 recent	examples	of	 the	ephemeral	nature	of	ethnicity;	
Leach	(1954),	Scott	(2009)	and	others	note	that	highlanders	have	switched	identities	from	Kachin	
to	Shan	within	 two	generations,	and	multiple	ethnicities	can	simultaneously	occur	 in	 individuals.	
The	 same	person	 can	be	a	Kachin	 in	one	 town,	 a	 Shan	 in	 another.	 In	 contemporary	Chiang	Mai	
province,	a	Karen	in	Omkoi	becomes	a	Thai	in	Chiang	Mai	town,	and	these	mimicries	solidify	into	
identities	over	time.	
Thailand’s	 Karen	 are,	 by	 and	 large,	 integrated	 into	 the	 Thai	 state	 to	 a	 greater	 degree	 than	
Hmong,	Lisu	and	others;	Hanks	et	al	(2001)	notes	that	they	were	not	even	considered	to	be	a	“hill	
tribe”	by	select	authorities,	although	they	were	still	considered	to	be	non-Thai.	Forsyth	and	Walker	
(2008)	note	the	generalization	of	Karen	by	Thai	authorities	as	“protectors”	of	the	forest,	 in	stark	
contrast	to	“destroyers”	such	as	Hmong8.	Karen	traditionally	cultivated	opium	for	their	own	use,	
rather	than	for	wider	markets.	The	depth	of	this	tradition	amongst	Karen	is	disputed	by	scholars	as	
well	as	interviewees:	nearly	all	agree	that	at	in	the	last	50	to	100	years,	opium	was	introduced	by	
Hmong	and	integrated	into	Karen	animist	and	other	cultural	practices,	or	simply	used	as	a	way	to	
pass	the	time9.	 	
While	most	Karen	no	longer	engage	in	cultivation	or	consumption,	in	remoter	parts	of	Omkoi	
their	cultivation	rates	are	the	highest	in	Thailand.	Omkoi’s	Karen,	then,	are	not	only	peripheral	to	
Thais;	they	are	generally	peripheral	to	other,	more	integrated	Karen.	
While	 James	 C.	 Scott’s	 research	 on	 Zomia	 (2009)	 is	 pivotal	 to	 analysis	 of	 Omkoi’s	 recent	
history	 and	 in	 explaining	 the	 different	 strategies/	 practices	 Omkoi	 Karen	 and	 other	 highlanders	
historically	 adopted	 to	 evade	 state	 control,	 the	model	 has	 its	 limits	 when	 it	 is	 used	 as	 a	 prism	
through	which	to	view	contemporary	Omkoi.	Scott	himself	states	that	Zomia	has	not	really	existed	
since	 the	 end	of	 the	 Second	World	War;	 it	 is	 anachronistic	 as	 per	 its	 intention.	 The	 Framework	
developed	 by	 Forsyth	 and	 Walker	 in	 Forest	 Guardians,	 Forest	 Destroyers:	 The	 Politics	 of	
Environmental	Knowledge	in	Northern	Thailand	(2008)	provides	more	clarity	to	Omkoi:	their	work	
demonstrates	how	the	state	uses	environmental	narratives	 to	consolidate	control	over	 the	 land,	
resources,	 and	 people	 (Forsyth	 &	 Walker,	 2008:	 231),	 and	 of	 how	 environmental	 and	 security	
concerns	are	conflated,	in	border	areas	in	particular;	these	prisms	are	being	used	in	order	to	cast	
Omkoi	as	symptomatic	of	a	crisis	that	must	be	solved	to	legitimate	the	state.	Scott’s	earlier	work,	
in	Seeing	Like	a	State	(1998),	is	also	broadly	supportive	of	Forsyth	and	Walker	in	that	it	describes	
the	 narrowing	 of	 the	 vision	 of	 state	 officials	 as	 an	 aid	 to	 control	 (Scott,	 1998,	 11);	 something	
particularly	 obvious	 in	 the	 simplification	 in	 which	 state	 actors	 view	 Omkoi,	 where	 the	 area’s	
complexity	is	reduced	to	manageable	dimensions	by	state	actors	(ibid.	22).	
2.2.	Omkoi’s	Forest	
	
“Utilitarian	discourse	 replaces	 the	 term	“nature”	with	 the	 term	“natural	 resources”…	plants	 that	
are	valued	become	“crops”,	the	species	that	compete	with	them	are	stigmatized	as	“weeds”,	and	
the	insects	that	ingest	them	are	stigmatized	as	pests.	Thus,	trees	that	are	valued	become	“timber”,																																																									
8	 This	dichotomy	was	most	obvious	in	the	Chom	Thong	upland	–	lowland	dispute	(Puginier	2003).	 	
9	 Interviews,	villagers,	CRSPO,	ONCB,	Mae	Tuen/	Omkoi	town,	Omkoi,	March	2016.	
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whilst	 species	 that	 compete	 with	 them	 become	 “trash	 trees”	 or	 “underbrush”.	 The	 same	 logic	
applies	 to	 fauna.	Highly	 valued	animals	become	“game”	or	 “livestock,”	while	 those	animals	 that	
compete	with	or	prey	upon	them	become	“predators”	or	“varmints.””	
-	James	C.	Scott	
Seeing	Like	a	State,	p.	13	
	
“…In	 national	 forests	 that	 the	 authorities	 declare	 to	 be	 reserved	 or	 restricted,	 people	 have	 long	
been	 there.	 It	 is	 strange	 to	 enforce	 the	 law	 against	 people	 who	 live	 in	 such	 areas,	 which	 have	
always	been	non-reserved,	but	only	lately	declared	reserved	because	of	some	lines	drawn	on	paper.	
The	problem	occurs	when	those	boundaries	are	drawn,	causing	the	people	inhabiting	those	areas	
to	become	“lawbreakers”.	In	terms	of	legislation,	they	may	be	seen	to	violate	the	law,	because	the	
law	is	legally	passed.	However,	if	we	consider	the	issue	naturally	as	to	who	is	actually	breaking	the	
law,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	lawmakers	are,	because	the	people	lived	in	the	area	long	before	the	
law	was	enacted.”	
	
-	King	Bhumibol	Adulyadej	
June	27,	1973	
	
Thailand’s	 rapid	 population	 increase	 and	 explosive	 rates	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	
accompanying	development	between	1960	and	2006	resulted	in	a	reduction	of	forest	from	53.33%	
to	30.92%	of	overall	land	area	(Ongprasert,	2011).	The	Royal	Forestry	Department	(RFD)	is	tasked	
to	enforce	C-Zone	regulations	in	Thailand.	It	was	initially	created	to	protect	and	regulate	Thailand’s	
teak	 supply	 in	 the	 late	1800s,	after	highland	Karen	began	“illegally”	 selling	 teak	 to	 the	British	 in	
Shan	and	 the	French	 in	 Laos.	 Ironically,	RFD	can	be	historically	 implicated	 in	 the	 introduction	of	
opium	 to	 Karen:	 they	 banned	 Karen	 from	 growing	 rice,	 which	 would	 have	 required	 large-scale	
forest	 clearing,	 but	 allowed	 them	 to	 grow	opium,	which	 required	much	 less	 clearing.	 The	Karen	
would	trade	the	opium	for	 the	rice	they	were	prohibited	from	growing	directly;	 the	government	
taxed	the	trade	as	well.	
Catastrophic	 flash	 floods	 in	 Thailand	 in	 1989,	 widely	 linked	 to	 deforestation,	 led	 to	
enhancements	 in	RFD’s	mandate,	 and	 soon	 subcontracted	Thai	demand	 for	 forest	products	 into	
Myanmar	 (Smith,	 1994),	 Karen	 National	 Union	 areas	 in	 particular10,	 while	 Thailand’s	 own	
watershed	 areas	were	 preserved.	 Since	 its	 inception,	 the	RFD	has	 been	 at	 loggerheads	with	 hill	
tribes,	denouncing	and	seeking	to	end	swiddening,	which	it	and	other	agencies	uniformly	oppose	
under	 the	mistaken	 impression	 that	 it	 is	 environmentally	 harmful,	while	many	 available	 studies	
demonstrate	 that	 it	 is,	 traditionally,	 a	 rejuvenating	 practice	 (Asia	 Indigenous	 People’s	 Alliance,	
2012;	 Bruun	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Erni,	 2009;	 Laungaramsri,	 2005).	 The	 Department	 of	 National	 Parks,	
Wildlife	and	Plant	Conversation	 (DNP)	has	been	hived	off	 from	the	RFD	but	 they	have	 the	same	
policies	 and	 the	 same	 regard	 for	 highlanders	 as	 their	 parent	 department.	 Both	 agencies	 are	
reportedly	corrupt	(Phromlah,	2013).	
RFD	agents	continually	encroach	upon	rights	recognized	by	Thai	authorities,	such	as	gathering	
fallen	wood	 to	use	 in	 cooking	 fires.	Whilst	 ad-hoc	 actions	 to	defend	 such	 rights	occur	 regularly,	
according	 to	 interviewees,	 a	 broader	 movement	 to	 guarantee	 hill	 tribe	 rights	 to	 engage	 in	
traditional	 practices	 has	 not	 yet	 emerged.	 In	 the	 mid-1990s	 the	 Northern	 Farmer’s	 Alliance,	
comprised	of	both	highlanders	and	Thais,	had	promise,	and	the	alliance	organized	a	march	from	
Nong	Tao	to	Bangkok	to	protest	the	expulsion	of	Karen	from	Gampong	Kit,	state	their	rights	over	
the	 forest	and	decry	RFD	abuses;	 in	Bangkok,	 they	were	able	 to	meet	 the	RFD	minister	“for	 five	
minutes”.	According	to	 interviewees	 in	Nong	Tao,	 this	was	the	pinnacle	of	Karen	participation	 in																																																									
10	 Interview,	 KNU	 representative	U	Mam	Char,	 Taung	Galay,	 Kayin	 State,	Myanmar,	December	 2016.	 The	
KNU	has	recently	declared	a	moratorium	on	forestry	in	its	areas,	and	signed	an	MoU	with	the	World	Wildlife	
Foundation	(Irrawaddy	2016).	
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civil	 society,	 and	was	 followed	 by	 a	 fall	 in	 alliance	members11.	 The	 last	 Karen	 community	 rights	
activist	of	note,	Porlajee	“Billy”	Rakchongcharoen,	was	illegally	detained	by	RFD	officers	in	Kaeng	
Krachan	National	Park,	Phetchaburi,	on	April	17,	2014,	on	the	orders	of	then-	park	superintendent	
Chaiwat	 Limlikitaksorn,	 who	 had	 ordered	 a	 Karen	 village	 burned	 in	 2011.	 Billy	 was	 never	 seen	
again12.	The	RFD	continues	to	blame	highlanders	for	 lowland	disasters,	 including	the	2011	floods	
and	a	2015	epidemic	of	lowland	haze.	 	
RFD	has	been	instrumental	in	the	configuration	of	Omkoi	within	the	state	as	a	C-zone	forest	
reserve13:	their	prism	through	which	they	view	the	reserve	prevents	much	of	the	population	from	
state	protection	in	the	form	of	citizenship.	While	in	most	cases	states	seek	legibility	of	populations,	
in	Omkoi’s	case,	the	RFD	purposely	keeps	populations	illegible.	And	while	Karen	have	traditionally	
found	themselves	regarded	by	the	state	as	protectors,	especially	vis	a	vis	Hmong,	in	contemporary	
Omkoi	they	are	labeled	the	destroyers.	Omkoi’s	watershed	status	can	also	be	viewed	as	political	in	
that	 it	 intends	 only	 to	 protect	 downstream	 (Thai)	 users;	 the	 designation	 is	 “a	 function	 of	wider	
value	 judgements	 about	 the	 appropriate	 use	 of	 the	 uplands,	 the	 purpose	 of	 environmental	
management,	and	the	status	of	different	speakers”	(Forsyth	&	Walker,	2008,	231).	
2.3.	A	Topography	of	“Criminality”	
In	 2009,	 ONCB	 realized	 that	 much	 of	 the	 opium	 seized	 by	 authorities	 was	 originating	 in	
Omkoi.	This	occurred	after	roughly	a	decade	where	no	cultivation	surveys	were	undertaken	in	the	
district,	 theoretically	 because	 cultivation	was	 thought	 to	 have	 ended14.	Whether	 cultivation	had	
ended	at	that	time	only	to	re-start	later	is,	in	hindsight,	questionable:	ONCB	data	reveal	significant	
cultivation	 from	 at	 least	 1995	 to	 2000,	 including	 a	 485%	 increase	 in	 hectares	 under	 cultivation	
between	 1997	 and	 1998.	 This	 increase	 in	 cultivation	 demonstrates	 Omkoi’s	 connection	 to	
international	markets;	in	the	same	year	in	Afghanistan,	Taliban	leader	Mullah	Omar	issued	a	fatwa	
declaring	that	opium	poppy	cultivation	and	heroin	manufacture	was	un-Islamic	(Rashid,	2000).	The	
price	of	heroin	soon	doubled	in	New	York	City,	and	nearly	two	decades	ago	unknown	persons	 in	
Omkoi	responded	to	opportunity.	 	
In	order	to	conquer	a	place,	one	must	first	map	its	people	(Anderson,	2006;	Scott,	1998;	Scott,	
2009;	Winichakul,	 1994).	 This	 is	 doubly	 true	when	 a	 stateless	 area’s	 resources	 are	 utilized	 by	 a	
stateless	people	in	a	manner	different	from	what	the	state	intends;	contestations	over	resources	
are	 implicit	 challenges	 to	 legitimacy15.	 In	 Omkoi	 this	 is	 the	 continuing	 process	 of	 conversion	 of	
highland	economies	and	highland	cultures—which	cannot	be	disentangled	from	one	another—to	
serve	lowland	needs.	Thailand’s	priority	is	security,	and	so	it	seeks	the	contours	of	a	topography	of	
crime.	The	Thai	state	does	not	know	the	identities	of	stakeholders	in	Omkoi’s	opium	economy.	But	
this	 is	 changing.	ONCB	has	 identified	a	network	constituted	of	 financial	 sponsors	 (some	of	 them	
non-resident	 Thai	 businesspersons	 operating	 in	 partnership	 with	 Karen	 leaders)	 and	 local	
government	officials,	both	Thai	and	Karen.	The	former	encourages	cultivation	and	purchases	the	
crop,	while	 the	 latter	 is	 either	directly	 involved	 in	 the	 trade	or	accepts	bribes	 to	 let	 it	 continue.																																																									
11	 Protests,	interviewees	note,	are	not	easy	to	sustain	over	time,	especially	when	“people	have	families	and	
need	to	work”	(interview	with	Jowalu	“Oshi”	Chindanai,	Nong	Tao,	June	23,	2016.	
12	 In	May	2015	Chaiwat	was	appointed	by	 the	DNP	 to	head	 the	Tiger	Corps	Operation	Unit,	 a	 forest	 and	
wildlife	protection	unit.	He	remains	the	only	suspect	in	Billy’s	disappearance.	
13	 Various	forest	management	initiatives	also	occur	in	C-zone	designated	areas,	including	the	establishment	
of	protected	areas	such	as	watershed	areas,	national	parks,	wildlife	sanctuaries	(Omkoi	contains	Thailand’s	
last	populations	of	wild	elephant	and	mountain	goat),	non-hunting	areas,	forest	parks,	biosphere	reserves,	
botanical	gardens,	and	arboreta.	
14	 The	 sudden	 end	 of	 surveillance	 in	 Omkoi	 in	 2000/	 2001	 makes	 little	 sense	 when	 one	 considers	 that	
185.92	Ha	of	opium	poppy	was	identified	there	in	the	1999/2000	season.	
15	 The	 inverse	 can	also	be	 found.	 Indonesia’s	annexation	of	Dutch	New	Guinea	 (later	 renamed	 Irian	 Jaya,	
followed	by	Papua)	was	initially	contested	by	an	insurgency	that	fragmented	across	decades.	Vast	tracts	of	
the	 territory	 are	 not	 contested	 and	 in	 those	 areas	 the	 state	 concentrates	 on	 resource	 extraction;	 when	
people	 pose	 no	 threat,	 they	 are	 provided	 with	 no	 services,	 and	 in	 many	 areas,	 aren’t	 even	 counted	
(Anderson	2015).	
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Many	 sponsors	 are	 anecdotally	 local	 politicians	 who	 finance	 electoral	 campaigns	 with	 opium	
earnings16.	 Of	 305	 local	 leaders	 and	 civil	 servants	 in	 Omkoi,	 ONCB	 has	 initially	 identified	 50	
involved	in	the	trade:	this	number	will	likely	rise.	 	
Anecdotally,	 in	 the	 vacuum	 of	 the	 state	 found	 in	 Omkoi	much	 crime	 exists	 besides	 opium	
poppy	 cultivation:	 stolen-to-order	 motorcycles	 and	 cars	 flow	 toward	 Myanmar,	 and	 trafficked	
people	emerge	from	there,	destined	for	Thai	farms,	fishing	boats,	and	brothels.	Ivory	trading	and	
illegal	logging	also	occur.	In	this	Omkoi’s	isolation	is	convenient,	even	purposeful:	according	to	one	
ONCB	 director,	 the	 government	 “intentionally	 makes	 Omkoi	 a	 forgotten	 place.”	 And	 although	
interviewed	 government	 officials	 claim	 that	 Omkoi	 is	 a	 place	 of	 exile	 for	 incompetent	 civil	
servants,	it	is	more	plausible	that	particularly	corrupt	civil	servants	seek	postings	there,	and	likely	
pay	a	commission	to	the	relevant	human	resource	office	to	secure	a	placement	in	such	a	profitable	
district.	 	
3.	A	Network	Governance	Approach	
The	Royal	 Thai	Government	 created	 the	multi-agency	 Centre	 for	 the	Resolution	 of	 Security	
Problems	in	Omkoi	(CRSPO)	in	2012,	mandated	to	suppress	opium	cultivation,	human	trafficking,	
and	 illegal	 logging17.	As	 the	CRSPO	has	more	clearly	discerned	 the	complexity	of	 the	area,	 it	has	
expanded	 beyond	 its	 initial	 security	 focus,	 moving	 beyond	 eradication	 and	 into	 alternative	
development	 and	 harm	 reduction.	 The	 ministries	 and	 departments	 represented	 in	 the	 CRSPO	
increased	to	22	in	December	2015,	and	now	include	education	and	health.	It	includes	ONCB,	which	
plays	 an	 overall	 coordination	 and	 eradication	 targeting	 role,	 and	 the	 Highland	 Research	 and	
Development	Centre	(HRDI),	which	introduces	replacement	crops	and	provides	extension	services	
to	 farmers	 in	eradication	areas.	 It	 also	 includes	 the	Royal	 Forestry	Department,	 the	presence	of	
which	lays	bare	core	paradoxes	in	the	approaches	of	different	state	actors.	The	CRSPO	has	no	hill	
tribe	representation,	civil	society	or	otherwise:	Karen	and	other	voices	are	not	contributing	to	the	
policies	which	 the	 paternalistic	 state	which	 regards	 them	 as	nak	 anurak	 is	 using	 to	 shape	 their	
futures.	
3.1.	Alternative	Livelihoods	
HRDI	 began	 providing	 extension	 services	 in	Omkoi	 in	 2009.	 Their	 contemporary	 alternative	
livelihoods	model,	antithetical	to	highland	traditions	of	swiddening	and	mobility,	provides	Omkoi	
cultivators	with	a	geographically	fixed	short-term	alternate	 livelihood	while	preparing	them	for	a	
longer	 term	one,	generally	an	estate	crop	with	a	3-5	year	cultivation	period	before	 first	harvest.	
This	 can	 include	non-agricultural	 alternatives	 such	as	 vocational	 and	 technical	 trainings.	But	 this	
“Royal	 Project	 Extension”	 is	 less	 successful	 than	 its	 predecessors	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 Northwest.	
Firstly,	 while	 the	 project	 is	 implemented	 by	 HRDI,	 it	 is	 not	 officially	 the	 Royal	 Project,	 and	
therefore,	it	does	not	carry	royal	authority.	The	Royal	Project,	by	law,	supersedes	other	laws,	most	
importantly	RFD	regulations	(see	below);	the	extension	does	not.	Secondly,	the	Royal	Project	does	
not	 serve	as	a	guaranteed,	 fixed-price	purchaser	of	new	substitute	crops	 in	Omkoi,	as	 it	does	 in	
other	 areas	 (Anderson	2017).	 Short-term	 crops	 such	 as	 cabbage,	 decorative	 flowers	 and	 lettuce	
provide	quick	returns	on	investment,	but	these	crops	are	generally	not	travel-worthy.	Good	roads	
were	 an	 important	 success	 factor	 in	 historical	 alternative	 development	 (Renard,	 2001);	 they	
ensured	 that	 produce	 arrived	 in	markets	 in	 a	 sellable	 condition,	 and	 they	 keep	 costs	 down,	 but	
good	roads	in	Omkoi	are	scarce.	The	state-resistant	areas	where	substitute	crops	are	most	needed	
are	 those	 same	 areas	 where	 ruined	 (or	 no)	 roads	 would	 most	 damage	 crops	 transported	 to	
market.																																																									
16	 ONCB	interviews,	Chiang	Mai,	December	2015.	
17	 Interview,	 7rd	 Infantry	 Colonel	 and	 CRSPO	 Secretary,	 Chiang	Mai,	 June	 21,	 2016.	While	Mae	 Sot	 is	 the	
primary	 entry	 point	 into	 Thailand	 for	 smuggled	 persons	 and	 illicit/untaxed/	 illegal	 goods	 including	
gemstones,	logs	and	drugs	(BBC	2001),	due	to	its	less	rugged	geography,	state	pressures	on	the	illicit	traffic	
crossing	the	Salween	River	result	in	places	like	Omkoi	acting	as	secondary	conduits.	 	
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Omkoi’s	licit	crop	cultivators	are	open	to	other	forms	of	abuse:	farmers	lack	vehicles,	and	are	
often	taken	advantage	of	by	middlemen	with	the	means	of	transport	who	fix	prices	and	reap	the	
benefit	 at	 lowland	 markets18.	 Less-duplicitous	 middlemen	 would	 need	 to	 pay	 low	 costs	 to	 the	
farmer	in	order	to	compensate	for	the	percentage	of	the	crop	which	will	be	lost	in	transport.	Other	
Omkoi	 farmers	are	caught	 in	an	exploitative	contract-farming	model,	with	 fixed	prices	 far	below	
the	costs	accrued	through	cultivation	and	maintenance.	In	the	remotest	areas,	crop	substitution	is	
diversified	 subsistence.	 Even	 without	 exploitation,	 the	 remoteness	 of	 the	 area	 means	 that	 the	
costs	 of	 business	 will	 be	 high.	 Alternative	 development	 remains	 constrained	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 land	
tenure:	homes	and	plots	 in	the	C-Zone	forest	reserve	will	not	be	 legalized.	Cultivators	have	 little	
reason	to	switch	to	legal	crops	such	as	Arabica	that	they	will	still	cultivate	illegally	for	less	income	
over	a	 longer	 time	frame.	A	 further	 impediment	 to	 land	tenure	 is	 the	 inability	of	many	Karen	to	
prove	 Thai	 citizenship.	 Land	 tenure	 is	 believed	 by	 RFD	 to	 be	 antithetical	 to	 watershed	
preservation.	These	factors	serve	to	make	short-term,	high-yield,	high	value,	easily	transportable	
and	 imperishable	opium	the	most	 logical	choice	for	those	poor	farmers	rendered	 illegible	by	the	
state,	especially	given	the	lack	of	law	enforcement	presence.	
The	 state’s	 alternative	 development	 approaches	 are	 constrained	 by	 intra-state	 divisions	
which	 the	 state’s	 Network	 Governance	 approach	 has	 yet	 to	 streamline	 (Jongruck,	 2012,	 2015):	
“State”	 is	 not	 a	 monolith.	 Personalities,	 networks,	 and	 interests	 shape	 the	 political	 ecology	 of	
opium	in	Omkoi.	Omkoi’s	paradoxical	designations	amongst	state	actors	results	in	varying	degrees	
of	 legibility	 based	 on	 the	 priority	 of	 a	 given	 department.	 This	 leads	 to	 policies	 which	 serve	 to	
cancel	one	another	out,	and	competing	 interests	are	most	apparent	 in	forestry	policy.	The	Royal	
Forestry	Department	only	grudgingly	and	occasionally	acknowledge	a	human	population,	and	they	
ignore	the	CRSPO,	even	though	RFD	is	a	member.	RFD’s	mandate,	captured	in	the	1964	National	
Forest	Conservation	Act,	contradicts	ONCB	and	HRDI	cultivation	reduction	strategies,	namely	crop	
substitution,	 infrastructure,	 services,	 and	 the	 “legalization”	 of	 a	 long	 resident	 population	 in	 the	
watershed	that	RFD	is	tasked	to	keep	free	of	human	habitation.	RFD	has	blocked	HRDI	attempts	to	
build	small	infrastructure	in	support	of	livelihoods.	RFD	policy	also	makes	the	construction	of	roads	
in	forest	reserves	difficult,	if	not	impossible:	the	application	process	takes	up	to	eight	years19.	Only	
recently	 the	 3rd	 Army	 forced	 the	 refurbishment	 of	 the	 107	 KM	 Omkoi	 ring	 road,	 through	 the	
intersession	 of	 members	 of	 the	 military	 currently	 in	 power	 in	 Thailand	 and	 allies	 on	 the	 Privy	
Council,	who	forced	RFD	Bangkok	to	approve	the	request.	RFD’s	prohibition	of	most	road-building	
is	not	unfounded,	however:	road	building	enables	illegal	logging	by	facilitating	access.	
The	 Thai	 Department	 of	 Local	 Administration	 (DOLA),	 for	 its	 part,	 seeks	 to	 make	 Omkoi’s	
population	 legible,	 and	 grant	 secure	 land	 titles:	 RFD	 prevents	 them	 from	 doing	 so.	 Despite	 the	
tenuous	illegality	of	these	settlements,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	Thai	authorities	will	relocate	Karen	in	
the	national	forest	to	other	areas.	According	to	guidelines	for	relocation	set	by	the	Thai	authorities	
in	the	1970s,	they	must	volunteer	for	relocation,	and	be	relocated	to	a	similar	ecological	zone	at	a	
similar	 elevation.	 Authorities	 have	 undertaken	 land	 exchanges	 where,	 in	 exchange	 for	 not	
swiddening	a	50	ha	upland	area,	they	are	provided	with	5	ha	of	lowland	rice	padi	land	to	cultivate.	
This	 approach	has	 serious	 limitations:	upland	Karen	areas	are	distinguished	by	a	paucity	of	 land	
and	a	scarcity	of	people,	whilst	 lowlands	are	the	inverse.	There	simply	isn’t	enough	lowland	padi	
for	 upland	 cultivators.	 For	 those	 who	 do	 make	 the	 exchange,	 this	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	
livelihood;	it	is	a	matter	of	culture,	and	of	incentivizing	Omkoi	Karen	to	be,	in	a	sense,	more	Thai.	 	
Despite	these	blockages,	RFD	are	not	actively	seeking	to	evict	Omkoi’s	Karen,	and	they	allow	
the	 cultivation	of	 crops	which	do	not	 involve	 land	 clearance,	namely	 coffee	and	avocados.	 They	
also	 haphazardly	 provide	 limited	 land	 use	 permits	 for	 Karen	 farmers.	 This	 is	 a	 foundation	 upon	
which	to	build,	but	whether	or	not	this	might	 lead	to	a	modification	of	RFD	policy,	and	a	middle																																																									
18	 An	 interviewee	 noted	 that	 cabbages	 and	 tomatoes	 her	 village	 cultivated	 were	 purchased	 by	 Thai	
middlemen	for	as	 low	as	1	baht	per	kilo;	 the	 introduction	of	Arabica	caused	a	wholesale	abandonment	of	
other	alternative	crops,	even	 though	Arabica	 is	also	a	buyer’s	market,	with	prices	 fixed	at	20-25	Baht	per	
kilo.	
19	 Interview,	ONCB	and	3rd	Army	Representatives,	Omkoi,	February	2016.	
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ground	 arrived	 at	 through	 a	 Participatory	 Land	Use	 Planning	 project,	which	 “seeks	 to	 achieve	 a	
successful	marriage	of	diverse	land	management	perspectives	in	transparent	and	locally	inclusive	
ways”	(Forsyth	&	Walker	2008,	245),	is	anyone’s	guess.	
3.2.	Eradication	
Despite	 five	years	of	eradication,	opium	cultivation	continues,	with	 little	discernable	 impact	
on	price;	CRSPO	activities	are	not	 impacting	 supply.	Early	2016	 interviews	with	ONCB	officials	 in	
Omkoi	reveal	record	numbers	of	fields	under	cultivation	in	Omkoi’s	far	east	and	northwest.	
Eradication	 occurs	 in	 a	 non-systematic	manner,	 partially	 due	 to	 the	 state’s	 inadequate	 but	
improving	surveillance	capability	 in	 its	remoter	corners:	ONCB	only	knows	the	number	of	plots	 it	
identifies	and	destroys,	not	the	total	number	of	plots	under	cultivation.	They	also	only	report	on	
the	 number	 of	 plots	 destroyed	 once,	 whereas	 the	 evasion	 strategies	 Karen	 cultivators	 have	
developed	result	in	staggered	crops	which	will	sprout	on	those	same	plots	destroyed	by	the	army,	
weeks	after	they	depart.	Each	planting	cycle	 is	roughly	3	months,	but	the	annual	opium-planting	
season	is	8	months;	several	overlapping	planting	cycles	occur.	Other	evasion	strategies	create	even	
more	 difficulties.	 For	 example,	 Omkoi’s	main	 opium	 poppy	 cultivation	 areas	 are	 at	 least	 2	 to	 3	
hours	by	road	(20	to	30	km)	from	Omkoi’s	district	center,	followed	by	a	hike.	No	roads	lead	directly	
to	poppy	fields,	which	lay	far	from	settlements,	and	so	no	information	connects	cultivator	to	crop	
unless	 they	 are	 apprehended	 on	 site.	 Plots	 are	 purposefully	 kept	 small,	 averaging	 .25	 Ha.	
Cultivation	occurs	on	 steep	slopes,	difficult	 to	detect	 from	satellite	 imagery.	There	 remain	areas	
that	the	state	cannot	see,	even	with	satellites.	The	friction	of	terrain	remains	as	important	now	as	
it	was	in	colonial	times.	
However,	cultivation	will	ultimately	decrease	as	both	the	state	continues	gathering	complex	
information,	 and	 cultivators	 gain	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 technology	 being	 deployed	 against	
them.	 In	Baan	Mae	Long	Luang	village20	 during	a	CRSPO	meeting	 in	February	2016,	each	village	
head	 denied	 opium	 was	 being	 cultivated	 in	 their	 area;	 the	 CRSPO	 representatives	 then	
demonstrated	 satellite	 technology,	 showing	 on	 a	 laptop	 computer	 the	 opium	 poppy	 plots	 in	
several	areas	surrounding	the	villages	of	the	attendees.	It	was	the	first	time	they	had	seen	such	a	
demonstration;	some	appeared	shaken.	
	
4.	Rethinking	policy	priorities:	
	
Omkoi,	 as	 a	 “stateless”	 region	 with	 little	 available	 data,	 will	 likely	 experience	 new	
contestations	 around	 expanding	 administration	 and	 coercive	 authority.	 The	 following	
recommendations	will	hopefully	inform	future	policy	interventions:	
a) Alternative	 Development	 and	 Markets:	 ONCB	 and	 HRDI	 should	 continue	 to	 concentrate	 on	
crops	which	do	not	require	land	clearance.	Arabica	coffee	remains	the	 ideal	crop:	it	earns	the	
highest	value	and	travels	the	best	on	bad	roads,	unlike	avocados	or	peaches.	It	requires	some	
shade,	 so	 the	 watershed	 remains	 preserved,	 and	 RFD	 implicitly	 does	 not	 object	 to	 it.	 The	
prohibition	on	chemical	fertilizer	and	pesticide	in	the	watershed	leaves	open	the	possibility	of	
internationally	 recognized	 organic	 certifications,	 a	 potentially	 lucrative	 opportunity.	 This	 is	 a	
process	that	HRDI	could	be	 instructed	by	the	CRSPO	to	undertake	on	behalf	of	 farmers.	HRDI	
should	 robustly	 intercede	 with	 RFD	 to	 provide	 20-40	 year	 limited	 use	 permits	 for	 Omkoi	
farmers,	 specific	 to	 crops	 requiring	 shade.	 Citizenship	 should	 not	 be	 a	 pre-requisite	 for	 the	
issuance	 of	 such	 permits,	 but	 those	 seeking	 such	 permits	 should	 have	 to	 meet	 criteria	
established	 for	 long-term	 residency	 as	 part	 of	 a	 citizenship	 application	 process.	 HRDI	 should	
explore	the	possibility	of	banks	recognizing	these	permits	as	collateral	for	credit	to	farmers.	The	
CRSPO	and	ONCB	should	also	concentrate	on	improving	market	linkages	between	farmers	and	
larger	coffee	buyers	that	have	reputational	concerns	over	Fair	Trade;	existing	middlemen	need	
to	 be	 removed.	 Lastly,	 HRDI	 needs	 to	 establish	 a	 physical	 presence	 in	 the	 most	 severe	
opium-producing	 regions	 of	Omkoi.	 This	 could	 involve	 contracting	 extension	 agents	with	 the																																																									
20	 This	area	was	so	afflicted	by	opium	use	that	“even	the	monks	needed	treatment”,	according	to	ONCB.	
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requisite	knowledge	of	Arabica	coffee,	either	from	the	CMU	department	of	agriculture	or	from	
agriculture-focused	NGOs.	
b) Citizenship:	 The	 state	 should	 consider	 establishing	 a	 process	 by	 which	 residency	 and	 land	
tenure	 can	 be	 granted	 according	 to	 local	 testimony	 and	 committee	 investigation.	 Residency	
should	 include	 a	 citizenship	 pathway,	 subsidized	 by	 the	 state.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 DNA	 tests	 for	
children	without	 birth	 certificates,	 the	 state	 should	 consider	 subsidizing	 these	 costly	 tests	 as	
well.	
c) Indigenous	rights,	legalization	and	representation:	the	CRSPO	should	form	a	dedicated	forestry	
sub-committee,	 co-chaired	 by	 RFD,	 ONCB	 and	 the	 army,	 and	 with	 Karen	 civil	 society	
representation	 and	 Karen	 testimony,	 to	 consider	 legalizing	 Karen	 villages	 known	 to	 pre-date	
the	 National	 Forest	 Conservation	 Act,	 with	 the	 stipulation	 that	 permanent	 land	 clearing	 be	
banned,	that	logging	remain	illegal	except	for	the	personal	use	of	indigenous	communities,	and	
that	no	new	construction	occur	(only	refurbishment	of	existing	structures)	except	for	potential	
new	health	 centers,	 schools,	 staff	 accommodation,	 and	 police	 stations.	 Road	 construction	 to	
existing	settlements	should	be	considered.	The	sub-committee	will	report	to	the	CRSPO,	which	
can	then	submit	findings	and	recommendations	to	the	national-level	ONCB	and	army	for	them	
to	intercede	with	relevant	national-level	actors	in	order	to	seek	Omkoi-specific	policy	changes	
with	the	agreement	of	the	national-level	RFD,	followed	by	instructions	to	provincial	RFD.	
5.	Conclusion:	 	
Under	 the	 auspices	 of	 a	 “war	 on	 drugs”	 and	 “alternative	 development”,	 the	 highlands	 of	
Northwestern	Thailand	were,	with	a	few	exceptions,	integrated	into	the	Thai	state	starting	in	the	
1960’s,	 through	 the	 extension	 of	 roads,	 the	 positioning	 of	 civil	 servants,	 and	 the	 extension	 of	
citizenship	and	services	to	hill	tribes.	The	conversion	of	highland	economies	to	fit	lowland	markets	
began	long	before	this,	and	opium	was	the	catalyst	for	that	economic	conversion;	it	was	the	first	
monocrop	 imported	 by	 outsiders,	 to	 feed	 lowland	 demand,	 and	 highlanders	 continue	 to	 be	
blamed	 for	 that	mutation	 of	 sustainable	 agricultural	 practices	 by	 non-highland	 elites,	 KMT	 and	
otherwise,	 who	 reaped	 the	 profits	 from	 that	 trade.	 However,	 population	 growth	 in	 the	 last	 70	
years	has	consigned	Zomia’s	methods	of	evasion,	agricultural	and	otherwise,	to	history.	This	was,	
and	 remains,	 traumatic	 to	 hill	 tribes	 who	 have	 seen	 a	 way	 of	 life	 end;	 younger	 generations	
gravitate	to	Thai	and	other	cultures.	
This	 process	 of	 statebuilding	 within	 non-state	 spaces	 continues	 in	 Omkoi,	 an	 area	
bureaucratically	 constructed	 in	 different	 ways	 by	 different	 government	 departments	 with	
differing,	and	often,	contradictory,	priorities.	For	some,	Omkoi’s	people	are	an	inconvenience,	and	
so	they	are	not	seen	in	favor	of	resources	useful	to	the	Thai	state;	for	others,	Omkoi’s	 illegibility	
may	 provide	 profitable	 opportunities.	 The	 current	 and	 varying	 bureaucratic	 constructions	 of	
Omkoi	within	the	state,	however,	have	been	recognized	by	government	actors	as	untenable.	The	
CRSPO’s	 network	 governance	 approach	 provides	 the	 best	 platform	 by	 which	 to	 mitigate	 these	
contradictions	and	create	a	cross-department	government	policy	that,	if	created	equitably,	makes	
Omkoi’s	 people	 as	 legible	 as	 its	 trees.	 The	 state	 wishes	 to	 reconcile	 a	 current	 overriding	
forestry-focused	policy	that	does	not	fit	with	facts	on	the	ground	in	Omkoi,	and	ultimately	it	may	
do	so	by	creating	citizens	of	Omkoi’s	stateless	peoples,	with	the	same	rights	and	access	to	services	
and	protections	as	other	Thais.	
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